Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1952

Trade Commission of Utah, Utah Retail Grocers
Association and George Ingalls v. James L. Bush :
Appellant's Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Athol Rawlins; C. E. Henderson; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
R. R. Bullivant; Of Counsel;
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Trade Comm. Of Utah v. Bush, No. 7783 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1669

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

fl:

,-~}If))'

:.it-tJa

In the

Court of the State of Utah

FILED
TRADE COMMISSION OF UTAH,

UN~

1952

Plaintiff and Respondent

---~- ---·-----------~-----

a ..k

. ---·---

Supreme Court, Utab

UTAH RETAIL GROCERS ASSOCI. ATION (:and GEORGE INGALLS,
-dba George'.s Market,
Plaintiffs in Intervention
and Respondents,

Civil No.
7783

vs.
IdES L. BUSH, dba Bush Super
~et,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
ATHOL RAWLINS,·
C. E. HENDERSON,
of RAY,

RAWLINS, JONES & HENDERSON,

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant.

R. R. BULLIVANT,
of the Oregon Bar, of Counsel.

"RROW PRUI, 8"LT LAKI

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

1

POINT I. RESPONDENTS HAVE DEFAULTED
IN ANSWERING POINT I OF APPELLANT'S
"BRIEF . . . .
..........................

4

POINT II. RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO
ANSWER POINT II OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF.

8

POINT III. RESPONDENTS' POSITION ON THE
QUESTION OF WRONGFUL INTENT IS
BOTH UNCLEAR AND UNSOUND . . . . . . . . . . .

13

POINT IV. RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MET
THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUEST I 0 N S
RAISED BY POINT IV OF APPELLANT'S
BRIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

POINT V. BRISTOL-MYERS V. PICKER, 302 N.
Y. 61,96 N. E. 2D 177 AND SCHUSTER & CO.
V. STEFFES, 237 WIS. 41, 295 N. W. 737 ARE
NOT PERSUASIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

TABLE OF CASES

Balzer v. Caler, 74 P. 2d 839, aff'd, 11 Cal. App. 2d
663, 82 P. 2d 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

Bristol-Myers v. Lit Bros., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A. 2d 843 . . .

21

Bristol-Myers v. Picker, 302 N. Y. 61, 96 N. E. 2d
177 ............................. 5, 9, 19, 20, 21, 22

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
Page
Cohen v. Frey & Sons, Inc., 80 A. 2d 267 (Md.
1951) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board v. Everglades Laundry, 137 Fla .. 290, 188 So. 380 . . . . . . .

18

Food and Grocery Bureau v. Garfield, 20 Cal. 2d 228,
125 P. 2d 3 .............................. 10, 13,21
Lambert Pharmacal Company v. Roberts Bros., 233
P. 2d 258 . .
. . . . . . . . .............. 10, 11, 12, 13
People v. Pay Less Drug Stores, 143 P. 2d 762 ...... 15, 16
Rast v. Van Deman, 240 U. S. 342 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5, 6

Schwegman Brothers v. Calvert Distillers, Inc., 341
u. s. 384 . . . . ............................. 11, 12
Schuster & Co. v. Steffes, 237 Wis. 41, 295 N. W. 737 .. 9, 22
Serrer v. Cigarette Service Co., 148 Ohio 519, 76 N.
E. 2d 91 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

State v. Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 Pac. 894 . . . . . . .

6

Sunbeam Corporation v. Klein, 79 A. 2d 603 ..... 10, 11, 13
Weco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores,
55 Cal. App. 2d 684, 131 P. 2d 856 .... 9, 10, 11, 13,21
TEXT MATERIAL

Opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma . . . . . . .

22

Rosenkampff and Wider, Theory of Accounts (1942)..

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
TRADE COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS ASSOC~
ATION and GEORGE INGALLS,
dba George's Market,
Plaintiffs in Intervention
and Respondents,

Civil No.
7783

vs.
JAMES L. BUSH, dba Bush Super
Market,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
In our main brief we first considered the question at
issue from the cost point of view because the Utah Unfair
Practices Act is a cost, not a price statute. In Point I we
argued that cash discount stamps are an element of cost, and,
as such, are covered by the statutory markup.
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We next considered the question from the price point
of view because that was the way the Trade Commission
looked at it. In Point II we argued that cash discounts, as
contrasted with trade discounts, do not reduce prices, but
relate only to the terms of sale.
After considering in Point III the element of intent,
we then took up the constitutionality of the Act, and showed
in Point IV (a) that the consequence of rejecting our argument in Point I was to render the statute unconstitutional if
the question were viewed from the cost point of view, and
in Point IV (b), that the consequence of rejecting our argument in Point II was to render the statute unconstitutional
if the question were viewed from the price point of view.
In either case, an unfair discrimination against the cashand-carry merchant and in favor of the credit-and-delivery
merchant resulted.
To find that our argument hung together, no matter
whether the stamps were looked at from the point of view of
the merchant's cost of acquisition or from the point of view
of his selling price, gave us a feeling of complete assurance
in the logic and validity of our client's position in this dispute. That assurance is now made doubly sure by the inability of the respondents to take a consistent stand in
opposition.
To meet Point I of our main brief it was incumbent upon
our opponents to argue that cash discount stamps are not an
element of cost, and, therefore, are not covered by the statutory markup. Not only do they fail to make this argument,
but, in Point IV of their brief, they adopt appellant's argument to the contrary.
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To meet Point II of our main brief it was incumbent
upon our opponents to argue that cash discounts cut prices.
They did make this argument, but, again, offered no answer to the constitutional problem which it raised.
All of this we shall presently consider in more detail,
but it seemed worthwhile to indicate at the outset that
whereas our argument hung together no matter how you
looked at it, our opponents' argument did not, and that
respondents' position on the various points which we have
raised is illogical and inconsistent.
As a further preliminary observation, we 'call the
Court's attention to the fact that our opponents make no
record reference to the testimony or to the exhibits, and,
therefore, as we understand it, adopt our statement of the
facts; and that, taken as a whole, their brief is entirely
negative in its approach to the problem under consideration.
Their principal argument seems to be that if any discount
is allowed, even though it be storewide and uniform in its
application, and even though it be no greater than what
is customary for cash discounts, the Unfair Practices Act
will be nullified. This, we submit, is nonsense.
Finally, we wish to observe that "the great price war"
in the retail grocery business in Ogden, which was featured
so prominently at the trial of this action, rates only a passing mention in respondents' brief.
POINTS RELIED ON BY APPELLANT
POINT I
RESPONDENTS HAVE DEFAULTED IN ANSWERING POINT I OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
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POINT II
RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO ANSWER
POINT II OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
POINT III
RESPONDENTS' POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF WRONGFUL INTENT IS BOTH UNCLEAR AND UNSOUND.
POINT IV
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MET THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY
POINT IV OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
POINT V
BRISTOL-MYERS v. PICKER, 302 N. Y. 61, 96
N. E. 2d 177, and SCHUSTER & CO. v. STEFFES,
237 Wis. 41, 295 N. W. 737 ARE NOT PERSUASIVE.
POINT I
RESPONDENTS HAVE DEFAULTED IN ANSWERING POINT I OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
In Point I of our main brief we contended that the
Commission had failed to make out a prima facie case because the Unfair Practices Act is a cost statute, not a price
fixing statute, and the evidence did not show that Mr. Bush
had sold any merchandise below either his actual or the
statutory cost. We based this contention upon the fact that
Mr. Bush's trading stamps, being an element of his cost of
doing business, were covered by the statutory markup of
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6%. We pointed out that cash discount stamps are an
element of the cost of doing business on the cash-and-carry
plan directly comparable to the extension of credit as an
element of the cost of doing business on the credit-and-delivery plan and, in the same general connection, that trading stamps as an attraction may counterbalance the attraction of free parking or some other service. From this we
argued that, if the statutory markup of 6% was intended
to cover such of these costs as were peculiar to the creditand-delivery merchant, the legislature must have intended
it to cover such of them as were peculiar to the cash-andcarry merchant for, otherwise, it would unfairly discriminate between the two.
Our opponents' only response is a quotation from
Bristol-Myers v. Picker, 302 N. Y. 61, 96 N. E. 2d 177, on
the difference between cash register receipts and free
parking as advertising media and a quotation from Rast v.
Van Deman, 240 U. S. 342, which is always thrown at the
trading stamp companies in litigation such as this because
of the colorful phrase "lure to improvidence." Neither of
these cases is in point, and in neither of them was the
quoted portion anything but obiter dictum. Neither of these
cases had anything to do with a sales-below-cost statute,
and, consequently, in neither of them was the Court called
upon to consider whether trading stamps, as an element of
the merchant's cost, would be covered by the statutory
markup designed for that purpose.
We shall presently refer at more length to BristolMyers v. Picker, supra, for it is upon that decision that
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respondents rest their chief reliance. Rast v. Van Deman,
supra, stands only for the proposition that a retail sale of
merchandise is a local act which comes within the police
power of the State where it occurs; and its invidious slur
upon the trading stamp business has been repeatedly rejected by Courts from one end of the United States to the
other and, among them, by this very Court in State v. Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563; which held that the trading stamp
business, making possible the allowance of cash discounts
on small purchases, was a legitimate enterprise.
In Point I of our main brief, we also called the Court's
attention to the fact that if stamps be considered as
concessions, Section 16A-4-9 of the Act specifically provides that "in all sales involving more than one item
* * * the vendor's * * * selling price shall not
be below the cost of all articles * * * and concessions included in such transactions" and that, therefore, even if we were to assume for the sake of the argument that the Act prohibits the granting of a cash
discount on the sale of a single item marked up no more
than 6%, it does not prohibit the granting of a cash discount on a transaction involving several items when the
average markup is more than s1;1fficient to offset the discount. In this connection, we showed, first, that the average markup is 13%, or more than enough to offset the discount in question (2.08%) . and, second, that it is only in
one sale out of a thousand, a fact which is neither denied
nor challenged, that the transaction is limited to a single
6% item.
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To meet this, our opponents argue that Section 16A4-9 is ambiguous (p. 16) and that the section obviously
means that each item in a multiple-item purchase must bear
its own share of the cost of doing business (i.e. must carry
the statutory markup) without regard to the markup on the
other items; and that to construe the statute otherwise is
to legalize "loss leader" merchandising.

Per contra, we suggest that not only is there no ambiguity in Section 16A-4-9 but that, if there were, it should
not be resolved in such a way as to convict a man of a
crime. We are dealing here with an Act which carries criminal sanctions.
We also remind the Court that "loss leader" merchandising is not charged here and is not here under consideration and that it will be time enough to study its impact
when, if ever, the occasion arises. "Loss leader" merchandising consists of the granting of extraordinary markdowns
on specific items, sometimes far below even wholesale prices,
for the purpose of attracting customers into the store. The
hope is that the customers will be misled into believing that
everything in the place is a bargain and that, therefore, the
consequent loss on· the "leader" merchandise will be more
than offset by the profit on other sales. No such situation
obtained in the case at bar. Mr. Bush gave no special discounts, and offered no "loss leader" merchandise. He did
not hold out to the customer an apparent saving on certain
items in order to lure him into the store, as our opponents
suggest, but offered a uniform cash discount on every item
in his store. That is not "loss leader" merchandising. Talk
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of "loss leader" merchandising is not germane to the present controversy and not helpful in its solution.
In Point I of our main brief we contended, finally,
that if only one sale out of one thousand sales consisted of
6% merchandise alone, a fact which was not denied, the
consequent violation of the Act, if any, would fall within
the rule of de minimis. The law does not concern itself
with such trifles.
In response, our opponents say, (pp. 14 and 15), that the
rule of de minimis does not apply because a cash discount
of 2.08% which has the effect of attracting customers to
a grocery store cannot be considered trivial. But we did not
make such an argument. Our contention, which we believe we stated in plain terms, was that if a discount
of 2.08% on that one sale out of a thousand which relates
to a single 6% item violates the statute, it is de minimis.
No answer to this argument has been attempted.
For the foregoing reasons, it may be said that our opponents have defaulted in answering Point I of our brief.

POINT II
RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO ANSWER
POINT II OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
In Point II of our main brief we contended that the
Commission had not made out a prima facie case even if the
present controversy is considered on the basis of price,
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rather than cost, for cash discounts, as contrasted with trade
discounts, relate to the terms of sale, not the price, and,
therefore, do not have the effect of cutting prices. As
authority for this contention we cited Rosenkampff and
Wide1·, "Theory of Accounts"; Weco Products Co. v. MidCity Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App. 2d 684; 131 P. 2d
856; and a very carefully reasoned opinion by the Attorney
General of Oklahoma. We also pointed out that the Utah
Unfair Practices Act itself quite properly differentiated
between trade discounts, which do affect prices, and cash
discounts, which do not, by requiring the retailer to deduct
the former but not the latter in determining his cost.
Our opponents' response to this is to cite the Picker
decision and Schuster and Co. v. Steffes, 237 Wis. 41, 295
N. W. 737, to the effect that cash discounts do cut prices,
and then go on to say, on the authority of the Picker decision, that if a 2% cash discount does not violate the Act,
a 6% discount will not violate it and the Act will therefore
be nullified. The same could be said of almost any trade
practice, no matter how free from illegality when legitimately used. Almost any practice can be abused, but that
is no reason to condemn it when it is not. As Judge Fuld
said in his dissenting opinion in the Picker case, in which
the Chief Judge joined, "Courts are not powerless to deal
with obvious subterfuges. * * * There is time to deal
with such situations when they are presented * * *"
In the case at bar, we are not dealing with any subterfuge. If the discount had exceeded the usual amount
allowed as an inducement for prompt payment, or if it had
varied in amount, or if it had been selective in its applica-
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tion, the case would be different, for a subterfuge would
have been indicated, but such was not the fact. What we
have here is a normal cash discount (R. 188), storewide
and uniform in its application.
Aside from offering the argument that, if a cash discount were allowed, it might be abused, our opponents tried
to explain away the California cases (Food & Grocery
Bureau V. Garfield, 20 Cal. 2d 228, 125 P. 2d 3 ; and Weco
Products v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App.
2d 684, 131 P. 2d 856) and to derive some comfort from
Sunbeam Corporation v. Klein, 79 A. 2d 603, and \Lambert
Pharmat-al Company v. Roberts Bros., 233 P. 2d 258, but
here we· submit they failed completely.
The California cases cannot be explained away: in the
Food & Grocery Bureau case the Court said, flatly, that trading stamps constitute a "discount given the customer in
consideration of his paying cash;" and in the Weco Products
case a higher Court said that this "ruling of the Court must
be regarded as conclusive of the status of the trading stamp
in commercial retail business." "A cash discount," said the
Court, "is a trade practice long established, and is authoritatively recognized as being not a deduction from the purchase price." (Citing: Montgomery's "Auditing Theory and
Practice," pp. 499-500.) Respondents read into the Food &
Grocery Bureau decision an indication that if the complaint
had not been. brought under the section of the California Act
that forbade gifts but had been brought under the section
which forbade sales below cost, the Court would have condemned the cash discount. T4,is is nQt only purely speculative but it is illogical because~··. if trading stamps are the
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equivalent of a cash discount, as the Court found, and not
a gift, they do not constitute something for nothing and
their effect is upon the terms of sale rather than the price.
In this respect, our view of the matter is confirmed and our
opponents' is rejected by the Court of Appeals of California
in the Weco Products case which held that cash discounts
do not cut prices.

Sunbeam Corporation v. Klein, supra, which our opponents cite for the proposition that the Supreme Court
of Delaware held that it was a violation of the Delaware
Fair Trade Act to issue trading stamps with the sale of
fair trade items, did not in any way concern trading stamps,
and was not decided by the Supreme Court of Delaware.
Similarly, Lambert Pharmacal Company v. Roberts
Bros., supra, which our opponents cite for the proposition
that the Supreme Court of Oregon, but for the decision in
Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers, Inc., 341 U. S.
384, would have held that the giving of trading stamps
with fair trade items effectuated a reduction of the price in
violation of the Oregon Fair Trade Act, stands for no such
thing. In suggesting that it does, our opponents draw from
the conduct of the Court, in asking for a reargument after
the Schwegmann decision, an intimation which the Court
itself took pains to foreclose by saying, "we intimate no
opinion on the questions originally presented and argued."
Even without such a statement, it should be obvious that
no intimation, one way or the other, should be drawn, for
Courts make a practice of refraining from rendering decisions on points which have become moot, and that, we
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submit, is the reason why the Supreme Court of Oregon
declined to go further with the case. The Schwegmann
decision, by invalidating the Oregon Fair Trade Act as
applied to non-signers, rendered the fair trade issues in the
Lambert case moot .
. There remains for comment only the concluding paragraph of Point II of respondents' brief in which our opponents profess not to understand the logic of the argument
commencing at page 34 of our main brief. We had there
suggested that, when the legislature directed the retailer to
deduct "all trade discounts" but forbade him to deduct
"customary [i.e. "true" or "normal"] discounts for cash"
in arriving at his cost of acquiring merchandise at wholesale,
it indicated an awareness that customary cash discounts do
not affect price. From this we argued that cash discounts
should not be considered to affect the cost at which the
ultimate consumer acquires the goods at retail for there is
no reason to make a distinction in this regard between purchases at wholesale and purchases at retail. Our opponents
suggest, per contra, that the legislature intended to make a
special exception in the case of the retailer and that its
failure specifically to repeat this "exception" for the benefit
of the ultimate consumer indicates that it intended the
latter to be excluded from its benefit. This, we submit,
is unsound, first because there is no conceivable reason why
the legislature should have desired to make a special exception in favor of the retailer and our opponents do not
offer any; and, second, because the legislature was not framing an exception but merely recognizing commonly accepted
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accounting practice when it differentiated between trade
discounts and customary cash discounts ; and, third, there
was no occasion to define cost to the ultimate consumer, for
it was cost to the retailer which the legislature selected as
the index to legality: nothing is said anywhere about the
ultimate consumer in that part of the Act now under consideration.
To ignore the fundamental difference between trade
discounts and customary cash discounts ; to cry that if a
normal cash discount is permit~ed, abnormal discounts which
are subterfuges cannot be prohibited; to try to explain away
the California cases (Food & Grocery Bureau, and Weco
Products) ; and to draw unsupported inferences from the
Sunbeam and Lambert Pharmacal cases is no answer, we
submit, to Point II of gppellant's brief.

POINT III
RESPONDENTS' POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF WRONGFUL INTENT IS BOTH UNCLEAR AND UNSOUND.
It is difficult to understand our opponents' position on
the question of intent.

Early in the trial they said that "an essential element of
proof that we must bear here is that these sales * * *
were made with the intent to injure competitors" (R. 68).
This statement of their legal burden conformed to the
very great weight of authority and was adopted by the
Trial Court in its Memorandum Decision (R. 16).
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At the close of the trial, however, they indicated the
belief that if a man sold any merchandise below cost, as,
in their opinion, the Act defined cost, he was guilty of an
unfair trade practice and for that reason could be considered
to have had a wrongful intent (R. 225-226). Practically
speaking, this read the question of intent right out of the
case.
Now, in respondents' brief, they cite all the cases in
support of the majority rule that a wrongful intent must
be proved, and all the cases in support of the minority rule
that it is enough to prove an injurious effect, regardless of
intent ( pp. 28-33) , and, without commenting on the reason
for the difference, which we explained in Point III of our
brief, or indicating what their own opinion is, make the
bald claim that they proved both a wrongful intent and an
injurious effect (p. 18). At the same time, they seem to
reverse the position that they took at the close of the trial,
for there they indicated that it did not matter what the
intent was if the act committed (sale below cost) was an
act forbidden (R. 225-226), but now they say that, so far
as intent is concerned, it does not matter whether the act
committed was forbidden or not, or whether defendant intended to violate the law or not, but only whether he intended to attract customers from other stores (p. 19). Having
taken this position, our opponents go on immediately to say
that it is always difficult to prove intent because no one will
ever admit "that he intended to violate the law." This, of
course, brings right back into the case the question of subjective intent to violate the law which our opponents, apparently, had just dismissed from consideration. With all of this,
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we confess that we do not know where they stand on the question of intent.
Respondents make no claim that they proved any actual
intent on Mr. Bush's part, except, of course, that he intended to attract business to his store, an intent which has
not heretofore been considered reprehensible. Instead they
rely upon certain obiter dictum in People v. Pay Less Drug
Stores, 143 P. 2d 762, to the effect that if a retailer sells
merchandise below cost, as in that case defendant did repeatedly, admittedly and flagrantly, and engages in "loss
leader" merchandising, which was also admitted, it may be
inferred that his intent is to injure his competitors. At the
same time, however, the Court, citing Balzer v. Caler,
74 P. 2d 839, aff'd 11 Cal. App. 2d 663, 82 P. 2d 19, said,
"It is, of course, true that all sales below cost are not prohibited. Only those sales accompanied by the requisite intent
are prohibited." The case, therefore, stands for the proposition that a wrongful intent must be proved as a question of
fact and cannot be presumed merely because sales have been
made below cost. This is made very clear by the Court's
statement at page 767, not quoted by our opponents, that
"There is no material and rational connection between the
fact proved (sales below cost) and the fact presumed (unlawful intent)," and by the Court's invalidation, for this
reason, of a statutory presumption of unlawful intent based
on sales below cost. The decision, it seems, to us, refutes
our opponents' position and sustains ours, viz : that a wrongful intent must be proved and cannot be presumed.
Such an intent was not proved in Balzer v. Caler, supra,
by the sale of Cornflakes below cost, from time to time,
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to meet competition ·and stimulate trade; it was proved in
People v. Pay Less Drug Stores, supra, by "loss leader"
merchandising and a large number of sales below invoice
or replacement cost. It was not proved, we submit, in the
case at bar by the issuance of trading stamps in an amount
appropriate for an ordinary cash discount as a uniform,
storewide practice, where the average markup was 13%
(R. 158, 195), and where the sale of a 6% item alone would
take place only once in a thousand sales (R. 141-142).
So far as concerns the effect of the trading stamps,
respondents proved no more than that they attracted
customers to Mr. Bush's store, which, of course, we admit,
but it was not shown that it was the stamps issued with 6%
items, rather than the stamps on the other 75% of his merchandise that constituted the attraction and it could hardly
have been the stamps issued with that one sale out of a
thousand sales which consisted of 6% items alone.
POINT IV
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MET THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY
POINT IV OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
In point IV (a) of our main brief we argued that if
trading. stamps are an element of cost and if, as such, they
are not covered by the statutory markup of 6%, the statute
is unconstitutional because, so construed, the markup would
cover all of the costs of the credit-and-delivery merchant but
only some of the costs of his cash-and-carry competitor,
and, hence, would unfairly discriminate in favor of the
former and against the latter.
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Instead of attempting to refute this argument, our opponents dismiss it with the statement that the basis for it
does not exist because, in fact, the statute does not discriminate but covers all of the costs of both types of merchant; and they then go on to quote the statute to show the
validity of their statement. This is astonishing to us, for it
is exactly what we argued in Point 1 of our main brief, and
we only suggested the contrary in Point IV (a) in order to
demonstrate the constitutional consequence of rejecting it.
Our opponents have thus not only underwritten Point I of
our main brief, but they have not even attempted an answer to Point IV (a).
In Point IV (b) of our main brief we argued that if cash
discount stamps are an element of price, as our opponents
think, rather than an element of cost, as we think, the Act
is unconstitutional because it makes no allowance for the
consequent difference in the overhead of the cash-and-carry
merchant as compared with the overhead ~f the credit-anddelivery merchant.
Our opponents have apparently interpreted this as a
plea that appellant be permitted to apply the statutory
formula and then deduct all the costs that he can think of
that he does not have but that one or more of his competitors
do have. We made no such foolish argument, and, therefore,
decline to be drawn into a discussion of it. The position that
we took was much simpler and more logical: namely, if
there is a fundamental difference between the overhead of
two types of merchant, one doing business on the cash and
carry basis and the other on the credit and delivery basis,
the statute should take that fact into account because it
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would be unfairly discriminatory under such circumstances
to fit the two into the same statutory straight jacket on
prices. This is what the Courts were talking about in Florida
Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board v. Everglades Laundry,
137 Fla. 290, 188 So. 380 (1939); Serrer v. Cigarette Service
Co., 148 Ohio 519,76 N. E. 2d 91 (1947); and Cohen v. Frey
and Sons Inc., 80 A. 2d 267 (1951), when they held that it
was unconstitutional not to take such a difference into
account in fixing or formulating prices for services or commodities; and these cases cannot be distinguished as our
opponents' endeavored tQ distinguish them, upon the ground
that they dealt with wholesale rather than retail prices, for
the same principal obviously applies in each case.
Either because they did not understand it, or because
they could find no answer to it, our opponents have, to all
intents, defaulted in answering Point IV (b) of our main
brief.
We see no necessity to discuss the blocks of cases cited
at pages 26-33 of respondents' brief for the proposition that
other courts have sustained the constitutionality of Unfair
Practices statutes. Although we do make the point (Point
IV (e) ) that the Act is indefinite where it should be quite
definite, and although the Trial Court damned it with faint
praise in finding that its "indefiniteness is not sufficient to
hold the act wholly unconstitutional" (Memo. Decision), our
principal point on the constitutional question is that it is
not the way the Act is written but the way the Commission
has interpreted it as applied to the facts disclosed by the
present record that impairs its constitutionality. Little, if
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any, light is thrown on that aspect of the discussion by respondents' cases.

POINT V
BRISTOL-1l1YERS v. PICKER, 302 N. Y. 61, 96
N. E. 2d 177, and SCHUSTER & CO. v. STEFFES,
237 Wis. 41, 295 N. W. 737 ARE NOT PERSUASIVE.
Respondents appear to place their principal reliance on
Bristol-Myers v. Picker because of the statements contained
in the majority opinion to the effect that the giving of cash
register receipts to the extent of 2112% of purchases was
the equivalent of a price cut and that, if prices can thus be
cut 21h%, there is nothing to prevent merchants from cutting their prices as much as they please. We submit that
the decision is not persuasive.
In the first place, the case does not deal with an Unfair
Practices Act but with a Fair Trade Act and this is a significant difference for at least three reasons that come immediately to mind. First, violation of Fair Trade Acts do
not depend in any way upon the ascertainment of costs or the
application of any formulae for the allocation of overhead.
Accordingly, the intent of the seller in cutting the price, if
that is what he does, is quite immaterial. Second, violation
of a Fair Trade Act does not ordinarily carry with it any
criminal penalties. And, third, since the object of the Fair
Trade Acts is to protect the good will of the manufacturers
of brand-name merchandise, anything which has even the
semblance of reducing prices may impair the effectiveness
of price maintenance.
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In the second place, the distinction between trade discounts and· cash discounts was not argued in the Picker
case and we believe that it was for want of enlightenment on that score that the majority of the Court could
not grasp the concept of a discount which affected only
the terms of sale, rather than the price, and could not
visualize any limit to the discounts that might be given if
even a small one were permitted. All through the opinion
and also in the opinion at Special Term (195 Misc. 151, 89 N.
Y. Supp. 2d 215) runs the thought that the defendants were
engaged in giving something for nothing. The merchandise
which could be secured in exchange for the cash register
receipts was referred to as "presents" and "gifts;" the retailers' organization which participated in the scheme was
called a "Dividend Club ;" there was no limit to the extent
to which the merchants could go; and, finally, their object
was not to reward prompt payment for cash but to protect
themselves from the competition of large department stores
in neighboring communities. In other words, the picture
was one of trade discounts, which can be limitless, rather
than cash discounts, which must bear a reasonable relation
to the financial benefits which flow to the merchant from the
prompt payment of his charges, the saving to him on capital
expense, reduction of bookkeeping overhead, and avoidance
of losses on bad debts. True cash discounts, "customary discounts for cash" have ascertainable limits.
In the third place, the Picker case did not involve trading stamps but cash register receipts and the Court did not
hold that they were the same thing. As we have pointed
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~

out above, there is a definite distinction between the two,
for one is given to enable the retailer to operate his busi~ ness on a cash basis and the amount must be related to the
:~ financial benefits flowing from prompt payment, while the
~ other is given (or was in the Picker case) for quite another
purpose and hence was "controlled" only by the exigencies of
the particular competitive situation.
As we read the opinion, the Court was aware of the
distinction between discounts and free parking when con~~
sidered as ~dvertising media, ~iz: that one is directly related
t- to the price of the commodity sold, while the other bears no
relation to it, but the Court appears to have been completely unaware of the very close analogy between the cost
to the cash-and-carry merchant of affording a discount
as an inducement for the prompt payment of cash, and
the cost to the credit-and-delivery. merchant of securing
capital in order to extend credit.
We are therefore much more impressed with the
thoroughness and breadth of the decisions of the California courts and the Pennsylvania Court in Food &
Grocery Bureau v. Garfield, 125 P. 2d 3, Weco Products v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 131 P. 2d 856, and
Bristol-Myers v. Lit Bros., 6 A. 2d, 843, than we are by the
Picker decision, for not only did one of these cases involve
an Unfair Practices Act, rather than a Fair Trade Act, but
they considered, separately and collectively, the financial
as well as the advertising effects of cash discounts and
~
showed an all around grasp of the problem which seems to
us to be lacking in the Picker decision. We should also
~ point out that the New York Court merely attempted to distinguish and not to reject these decisions. For the same
\~·
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reasons we are impressed with the thoroughness of the opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, which we have
referred to at page 40 of our main brief and of which we
shall ask leave to hand copies to this Court upon the argument of the present appeal.
In closing we should also .refer to the case of Ed.
Schuster and Co. v. Steffes, supra, cited by respondents along
with the Picker case at page 9 of their brief, as authority
for the proposition that cash discounts cut prices. The
Schuster case, however, presented a special situation involving the Wisconsin Regulation of Trading Stamps Act
(Wisconsin Statutes Chap. 100, Sec. 100.15) which provides
( 1) that trading stamps shall be redeemable only for cash
in the amount stated on their face, and that (2) such stamps
shall not be issued with fair traded items when the price
obtained on the resale, less the redemption value of the
stamps, is less than the stipulated fair trade price. The
only issue, therefore, was whether the Act in question
came within the police power of the State of Wisconsin
and not whether trading stamps cut prices or merely affected the terms of sale.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the trial court should be reversed and
the complaint dismissed.
Dated, June 2, 1952.
Respectfully submitted,
ATHOL RAWLINS,
C. E. HENDERSON,
of RAY, RAWLINS, JONES & HENDERSON,
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant.
R. R. BULLIVANT,
of the Oregon Bar, of Counsel.
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